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Abstract. Intrusion Detection is an invaluable part of computer 
networks defense. An important consideration is the fact that raising 
false alarms carries a significantly lower cost than not detecting at-
tacks.  For this reason, we examine how cost-sensitive classification 
methods can be used in Intrusion Detection systems. The perform-
ance of the approach is evaluated under different experimental con-
ditions, cost matrices and different classification models, in terms of 
expected cost, as well as detection and false alarm rates.  We find 
that even under unfavourable conditions, cost-sensitive classifica-
tion can improve performance significantly, if only slightly. 
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1 Introduction 
Standard classification problems require making the classification decision 
that minimizes the probability of error. However, for many problem do-
mains, the requirement is not merely to predict the most probable class la-
bel, since different types of errors carry different costs. Instances of such 
problems include authentication, where the cost of allowing unauthorized 
access can be much greater than that of wrongly denying access to author-
ized individuals, and intrusion detection, where raising false alarms has a 
substantially lower cost than allowing an undetected intrusion. In such 
cases, it is preferable to make the classification decision that has minimum 
expected cost, rather than that with the lowest error probability. 
While there has been an extensive body of work in this field, particu-
larly in the domain of optimal statistical decisions (see for example [1] for 
an overview), this has been largely ignored in the domain of intrusion de-
tection. We are currently aware of two other papers ([2], [3]) dealing with 
cost-sensitive intrusion detection, both using a wrapper algorithm (Meta-
Cost [4] and Weighted [5] respectively) together with RIPPER [6].  Al-
though both papers report results on the KDD database, neither does so for 
the given cost matrix, so direct comparisons between the statistical models 
employed herein and the wrapper algorithms are not possible. This paper 
attempts to answer some very basic questions about cost-sensitive classifi-
cation. Firstly, to what extent must the test distribution match the training 
data distribution. Secondly, for the dataset used, are some methods consis-
tently better than others, or is there some variability and why. Finally, to 
what extent does the false alarm rate grow when the cost of missed attacks 
rises with respect to the cost of false alarms. 
The next section discusses how to use classification methods that can be 
readily embedded in the formal optimal statistical decision framework in 
order to create intrusion detection systems that will be effective in mini-
mizing the expected cost of their operation and analyses the relationship 
between cost matrices and the desired trade-off between detection and 
false alarm rates. Finally, it gives a brief introduction to the classification 
models used. Section 3 outlines the experiments performed and we con-
clude with a discussion on the significance of the results and on future re-
search directions. 
2 Cost sensitive classification 
Given a specification of costs for correct and incorrect predictions, the 
class decision should be the one that leads to the lowest expected cost, 
where the expectation is computed using the conditional probability of 
each class given the example, according to our model†. More formally, for 
a set Ω of k classes let a k x k matrix C such that C(i, j) is the expected 
cost of predicting class i when the true class is j. If i = j then the decision is 
correct, while if i ≠ j the decision is incorrect. Furthermore, let Y, H be 
random variables denoting the actual and hypothesized class labels. For 
any observations x∈X the optimal decision will be the class i that mini-
mizes a loss function equal to the expected cost 
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where ( )X|YP denotes the conditional distribution of class labels given an 
observation, according to our model. In this framework, all that is neces-
sary is a model that can estimate this probability. The cost-sensitive deci-
sion-making function Ω→Sf:  would then simply chose the decision i 
that minimises the expected cost given the decision and the example‡. 
More formally, 
( )i,xLminarg)x(f
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The form of the cost matrix C will depend on the actual application. In 
general, it is reasonable to choose the diagonal entries equal to zero, i.e. 
C(i, j) = 0 for i = j, since correct classification normally incurs no cost. 
The other entries specify the cost of incorrectly misclassifying an example 
of class j as belonging to class i. They should be non-negative if the diago-
nal is zero, i.e. C(i, j) ≥ 0 for i ≠ j. Note that when this is equal to 1, the 
cost measure is the same as the classification error measure. 
                                                     
† The implicit dependency on some model m can be made explicit by conditioning 
everything on the model. Then the expectation would be written [ ]m,f,x|CE  and 
the conditional class probability ( )m,x|yP . 
‡ Which of course is not necessarily identical to the decision with the minimum er-
ror probability. Furthermore, this framework is easily extensible to the case where 
the set of decisions differs from the set of class labels. 
2.1 Choice of the cost matrix 
As an example, consider a cost matrix C for two classes, positive and 
negative. The cost of a false positive is C(2, 1), while that of a false nega-
tive is C(1, 2) and we can set C(1, 1) = C(2, 2) = 0, i.e. a correct classifica-
tion will have no cost. For intrusion detection applications, it is common to 
refer to attacks as positive and normal instances as negative example. Fur-
thermore, the occurrence of false negatives (FN) is usually considered a 
worse kind of error than that of a false positive (FP), thus the matrix C 
should reflect that, by having C(1, 2) ≥ C(2, 1). In some cases, such as in 
some benchmark databases for intrusion detection, the cost matrix is given, 
while in others it must be chosen by the user. 
2.2 Algorithmic comparisons and alternative quality metrics 
When comparisons are made between algorithms, it is important to use the 
same measure of quality for all of them. A common measure of quality is 
the empirical value of the expected value of the cost C measured over an 
independent test set D, 
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where ( )dd y,xd ≡ . Whenever such a cost matrix is set as the evaluation 
metric in a benchmark database, then it is preferable to use it. However, it 
is important to note that in much of the literature, the following pair of 
measures is used instead. The Detection Rate (DR), and the False Alarm 
(FA) rate 
TNTP
TPDR += ,  FPTN
FPFA +=  
(4) 
where TP, TN, FP, FN, denote the number of true (T) and false (F) posi-
tives and negatives respectively. The aim would be to reduce FA rate, 
while at the same time increasing DR. Since this is not usually possible, a 
trade-off between the two quantities is often sought instead. While such a 
trade-off may be automatically accomplished through the use of an appro-
priate cost matrix§, in this paper we will only use these quantities as a sec-
ondary alternative comparison metric. 
                                                     
§ Let the expected cost be E[C] = qP(H = 1|C = 2)P(C = 2) +r P(H = 2|C = 
1)P(C =1) = q(1 - DR)P(C = 2) + rFA P(C = 1), where 2 denotes a positive exam-
ple. Setting r = 1/P(C = 1) and q = k/P(C = 2) we obtain a cost function minimiz-
2.3 Models 
As mentioned in the beginning of Section 2, the computation of class 
probabilities is model-dependent. Ideally one would assume a Bayesian 
viewpoint and consider a distribution over all possible models in a set of 
models, however in this case we will only consider point distributions in 
model space, i.e. a single parameter vector in parameter space. While this 
can cause problems with overfitting, we will use frequentist model selec-
tion methods to avoid this potential pitfall. These are described further in 
Section 3.2. The rest of this section gives a brief overview of the two mod-
els used in this work, the multilayer perceptron (MLP) and the Gaussian 
mixture model (GMM). A specific instance of an MLP can be viewed sim-
ply as a function Ω→Sg: , where g can be further defined as a composi-
tion of other functions ZS:zi → . In most cases of interest, this decompo-
sition can be written as ))x(zw(K)x(g ′= , with Sx∈ , w being a 
parameter vector, while K is a particular kernel and the function ( ) ( ) ( )[ ],...xz,xzxz 21= is referred to as the hidden layer. For each of those, 
we have )xv(K)x(z iii ′= , where each iv  is a parameter vector, [ ],...v,vV 21=  is the parameter matrix of the hidden layer and finally Ki is 
an arbitrary kernel. For this particular application wish to use an MLP m as 
a model for the conditional class probability given the observations, i.e. 
),x(gy),mM,xX|yY(P ====  (5)
for which reason we are using a sigmoid kernel for K. In the experiments 
we shall be employing a hyperbolic tangent as the kernel for the hidden 
layer, when there is one. The case where there is no hidden layer is equiva-
lent to zi = xi and corresponds to the linear model. The GMM, the second 
model under consideration, will be used to model the conditional observa-
tion density for each class, i.e. 
)mM,yY|xX(P ===  (6)
This can be achieved simply by using a separate set of mixtures yU  for 
modeling the observation density of each class y. Then, for a given class y 
the density at each point x is calculated by marginalizing over the mixture 
components yUu∈ , for the class, dropping the dependency on m for sim-
plicity. 
                                                                                                                         
ing FA - kDR, with k being a free parameter specifying the trade-off we are inter-
ested in.  
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Note that the likelihood function ( )uU|xXp ==  will have Gaussian form, 
with parameters uΣ , the covariance matrix and uμ  the mean vector, while ( )yY|uUP ==  will be another parameter, the component weight**. Finally, 
we must separately estimate P(Y = y) from the data, thus obtaining the 
conditional class probability given the observations 
( ) ( ) ( )yYPyY|xXP
Z
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where ( ) ( )∑ ==== ∈Ωj jYPyY|xXPZ does not depend on y and 
where we have again dropped the dependency on m. 
The conditional class probabilities from either (7) or (8), depending on the 
model, can then be plugged into (1), for calculating the decision function 
(2). 
3 Experiments 
In order to examine the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we con-
ducted a series of experiments under varying conditions. In our experi-
ments we performed comparisons in terms of the weighted cost defined in 
equation (3) using four different models: the MLP, Linear, GMM with di-
agonal covariance matrixes and Naïve Bayes models (GMM with a single 
Gaussian). It was expected that using the cost matrix to make decisions 
would result in a lower cost than when not doing so, even if the models’ 
class probability estimates are not very accurate.  A particularly interesting 
question was how the divergence between the training and testing data dis-
tributions affects the measured cost, for a fixed cost matrix.  We further-
more investigated how the false alarm and detection rates change when we 
vary the relative cost of false alarms and false negatives.  
3.1 Databases 
We performed our experiments on the KDD database [7], using the 10% 
KDD dataset for training and cross-validation. The KDD dataset include 
                                                     
** Since we use separate mixture components for each class, 0)yY|uU(P === , when 
yUu∉ , which also allows us to drop the dependency on y in the likelihood function. 
four types of attacks Denial of Service (DoS), Remote to Local (R2L), 
User to Root (U2R) and Probe. 
Denial of Service (DoS): The main aim of a DoS attack is the disruption 
of services by attempting to limit access to a machine or service. Examples 
are back, land pod teardrop, smurf and neptnune. 
Remote to Local (R2L): In a remote to local attack the attacker gains un-
authorized local access from a remote machine and exploits this access in 
order to send packets over the network. Examples are Ftp_write, Guess 
passwd, Imap, warezclient, warezmaster, phf, spy and multihop.  
User to Root (U2R): In U2R the attacker gains unauthorized access to lo-
cal super user (root) privileges. Examples are Loadmodule, Perl, rookit and 
buffer overflow. 
Probe: the attacker scans a network in order to find vulnerabilities requires 
little technical expertise. Examples are ipsweep, nmap, portsweep and sa-
tan.  
 Furthermore we performed two evaluations. For the first evaluation, we 
used the standard test KDD dataset, which includes 311,029 connections, 
including 17 types of attacks which are never observed in the training data-
set. More specifically, in the full test data there are 4 new U2R attacks that 
correspond to the 92.90% (189/228) of the U2R class, 7 new R2L attacks 
that correspond to 63% (10196/16189) of R2L class in that dataset, 4 new 
DoS attacks that correspond to 2.85% (6555/229853) of the DoS class and 
2 new types of Probe attacks that correspond to 42.94% (1789/4166) of all 
the Probe attacks. For this reason, for our second evaluation we used a ver-
sion of this dataset which does not include these novel attacks. In both 
cases, the probability distribution of the test datasets is not the same as that 
of the training dataset.  
The datasets are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1. Proportion of attack and normal connections for training and testing 
datasets.  
Datasets Probe DoS R2L U2R Total  
Attacks 
Total  
Normal 
10% KDD 
Dataset 
4107 391458 1126 52 396743 97278 
Test Dataset 1 4166 229853 16189 228 250436 60593 
Test Dataset 2 2377 223298 5993 39 231707 60593 
3.2 Technical details 
In order to select the best parameters for each model we performed 10-fold 
cross validation. For each MLP model we tuned three parameters, the 
learning rate (η), the number of iterations (Τ) and the number of hidden 
units (n_h). Keeping stable the n_h (equal to 0) we selected the appropriate 
η among values that range between 0.0001 and 0.1 with step 0.1 and the 
appropriate Τ selecting among 10, 100, 500 and 1000. For the selection of 
the appropriate n_h, having selected the appropriate η and the appropriate 
of Τ, we examined various values for n_h and selected the best among 10, 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160, 320. We additionally, used the MLP 
model with no hidden units as a Linear model. 
For the GMM model we also tuned three parameters the threshold (θ), 
the number of iterations (Τ) and the number of Gaussian Mixtures (n_g). 
Keeping stable the n_g (equal to 20) we selected the appropriate θ among 
values that range between 0.0001 and 0.1 with step 0.1 and the appropriate 
Τ among 25, 100, 500 and 1000. For the selection of the appropriate n_g, 
after selecting the appropriate θ and the appropriate Τ, we examined vari-
ous values for the n_g and the selected the best among 10, 20, 40, 60, 80, 
100, 120, 140, 160, 320. We additionally, used the GMM model with one 
Mixture component as a Naïve Bayes model. 
We have used the cost matrix defined for the KDD 1999 Dataset [8], 
which is shown in Table 2. We have also defined an arbitrary table in order 
to examine how the measured cost changes when the relative cost for the 
misclassification of attack versus normal connection increases. Thus, we 
define a 5x5 cost matrix A where A(j,1)=α, and A(1,i)=1 for j=2,3,4,5 and 
i=2,3,4,5. Also A(i,j)=0, for i=2,3,4,5 and j=2,3,4,5, A(1,1)=0 and a take 
values between 1 and 10 with step 1. Since the fields of the KDD dataset 
include discrete and continuous values, we represent the discrete values us-
ing one hot encoding. Furthermore, to ensure a good behaviour of all train-
ing algorithms we have normalized all the datasets to zero mean and unit 
variance. 
Table 2. Cost matrix for the KDD 99 dataset.  
              Predicted 
Actual 
Normal Probe DoS U2R R2L 
Normal 0 1 2 2 2 
Probe 1 0 2 2 2 
DoS 2 1 0 2 2 
U2R 3 2 2 0 2 
R2L 4 2 2 2 0 
3.3 Results 
We have evaluated each algorithm both with and without the use of a cost 
matrix for making decisions. Table 3 shows the results for Dataset 1, while 
Table 4 for Dataset 2. In both cases, μ is the expected cost, while low and 
high are the boundary values of the 99% confidence interval.  The latter 
was estimated using 1000 bootstrap [9] samples of the test datasets. 
It is clear that the empirical average cost for Dataset 1 is much higher 
than the corresponding cost for Dataset 2. Τhis was expected, since Dataset 
1 includes types of attacks that were not included in the training data. It is 
also evident that the Linear and GMM classifiers both achieve better re-
sults when we are using the cost matrix to make decisions. However, this 
was not the case for either the MLP or the Naive Bayes classifier. The lat-
ter's failure could be attributed to the fact that the Naive classifier assumes 
that all features of the training Dataset are independent. The reason for the 
behaviour of the MLP is not entirely clear. One possibility is that the prob-
abilities that the model outputs do not accurately represent the uncertainty 
of classification, i.e. the classifier is 'too confident' due to the maximum 
likelihood training. However, we also note that nevertheless the MLP 
model performed as well as the weighted GMM model. This hypothesis is 
consistent with the fact that the MLP nevertheless performed as well as the 
weighted GMM model in Dataset 1, but significantly worse in Dataset 2. 
We have performed a series of experiments for the MLP classifier, since 
this one presents the lower classification error, for the arbitrary cost matrix 
described in section 3.2. We examined how the performance of the MLP 
changes when we increase the cost (α) of false positives relative to that of 
false negatives. Again, we used the boostrap methodology to obtain confi-
dence intervals for the results. 
Table 3. Expected cost (μ) and boundary values (Low, High) with confidence 
99% for Testing Dataset 1 with and without the use of a cost matrix.  
 Without Cost With Cost 
 Low μ High Low μ High 
MLP 0.2384 0.2427 0.2472 0.2390 0.2431 0.2476 
Linear 0.2425 0.2467 0.2511 0.2414 0.2452 0.2489 
GMM 0.2497 0.2538 0.2578 0.2378 0.2420 0.2457 
Naïve Bayes 0.3786 0.3829 0.3871 0.5304 0.5400 0.5353 
Table 4. Expected cost (μ) and boundary values (Low, High) with confidence 
99% for Testing Dataset 2 with and without the use of a cost matrix.  
 Without Cost With Cost 
 Low μ High Low μ High 
MLP 0.0711 0.0736 0.0759 0.0713 0.0739 0.0765 
Linear 0.0735 0.0761 0.0784 0.0716 0.074 0.0763 
GMM 0.0821 0.0845 0.0869 0.0686 0.071 0.0734 
Naïve Bayes 0.2173 0.2204 0.2231 0.3733 0.3775 0.3817 
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(a) Expected Cost for Testing Dataset 1     (b) Expected Cost for Testing Dataset 2 
Fig. 1. Expected cost (μ) for Testing Datasets 1 (a) and 2 (b) respectively, with the 
cost of false negatives (attacks detected as normal) being equal to α, and the cost 
of false positives (false alarms) set equal to 1. The dashed lines (+,-) represent the 
bootstrap estimate of the 99% confidence intervals. 
In Fig. 1 (a) and (b) the middle line (μ) represents the expected cost as it 
was estimated for the testing Datasets 1 and 2 respectively. The surround-
ing lines denote the 99% confidence interval of the expected cost as this 
was estimated from the bootstrap samples. From Fig. 1 (a) and (b), it is 
clear that the expected cost for Datasets 1 and 2 respectively, increases 
linearly with α, which indicates a good behavior of the classifier. 
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(a) Detection Rate for Testing Dataset 1    (b) Detection Rate for Testing Dataset 2 
Fig. 2.  The Detection Rate (DR) evaluated on Testing Datasets 1 (a) and 2 (b) re-
spectively, with the cost of false negatives (attacks detected as normal) being 
equal to α, and the cost of false positives (false alarms) set equal to 1. 
In Fig. 2 (a) and (b) we observe the detection rate for each type of attack 
for both testing datasets. The Detection Rate (DR) of all attacks is better 
for Dataset 2 while there is an increase of the Detection Rate for all type of 
attacks and both Datasets. While we observe a significant increase in the 
detection rate for the attacks in the training Dataset, this is not the case for 
the novel attacks, especially for the R2L attacks. The Detection Rate for 
DoS and Probe attacks presents only a slight increase for both cases. While 
for U2R attacks and Dataset 1 the Detection Rate ranges from 0.184 to 
0.325 an increase of 14.1%. For U2R attacks and Dataset 2 we also ob-
serve a substantial increase of the Detection Rate from 0.615 to 0.82, an 
increase of 20%. For R2L attacks and Dataset 1 there is an increase of the 
Detection Rate from 0.06 to 0.108, an increase of 10.2%. For R2L attacks 
and Dataset 2 the Detection Rate ranges from 0.163 to 0.297, an increase 
of 13.4%.  
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Fig. 3. The average DR for each Testing Dataset using the MLP classifier for vari-
ous values of the cost of false positives relative to that of false negatives (α). 
In Fig. 3 we observe that the average Detection Rate (DR) presents a 
slight increase from 0.913 to 0.919 for Dataset 1 and from 0.977 to 0.98 
for Dataset 2. Fig. 4 depicts how the False Alarm (FA) rate is influenced 
by the increase of the cost of false positives relative to that of false nega-
tives. We observe a slight increase from 0.016 to 0.018, thus the increase is 
of 0.2%. The False Alarm (FA) rate is the same for both Datasets since the 
number of normal connections is the same in both Datasets. Overall, the 
detection was increased significantly for the U2R (20%) and R2L (13.4%) 
attacks for Dataset 2, but not for novel attacks in these categories.  In any 
case, the increase in false alarms was only 0.2%. 
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Fig. 4.  The FA rate for each Testing Dataset using the MLP classifier for various 
values of the cost of false positives relative to that of false negatives (α). 
4 Discussion 
The experimental results indicate that cost-sensitive classification methods 
using standard statistical classifiers to estimate class probabilities can be-
have quite well even in some cases where assumptions about the test data 
distribution are violated. This is not true for all methods tested. For the Na-
ïve model, this can be explained by the fact that the assumption of feature 
independence cannot be maintained. However the behaviour of the MLP 
model is not as easy to explain. One possible explanation could have been 
that the predicted class probabilities by the MLP are more close to 1 than 
is warranted. However, Fig. 1-4 do not give support to this hypothesis. On 
the other hand, while the GMM’s cost is significantly reduced when using 
weighted decisions, as can be seen by the lack of overlap between the con-
fidence intervals, the MLP (whether weighted or not) is performing just as 
well as the weighted GMM in terms of cost. A possible explanation then is 
that the training and test data distributions are different enough for the 
generalization ability of a classifier to be more important than the use of 
the correct cost matrix.  
Future work would have to further examine the relationship between 
distribution divergence and the use of cost matrices. An interesting ap-
proach would be to use fully Bayesian methods, and also to perform more 
complete comparisons. A final point that we have only touched upon in the 
introduction is that the set of actions does not necessarily have to coincide 
with the set of classes. Then we would make decisions that minimise the 
expected cost of each decision.  Examples of such decisions would be “Do 
nothing”, “Call Administrator”, “Block IP Address”.  Furthermore, we 
could even consider intrusion detection as a sequential decision making [1] 
problem, where each decision would not only depend upon the current ob-
servation, but on the history of observations and past decisions. This would 
not only make such systems more flexible, but could also reduce much of 
the future engineering performed in order to select what is the best time 
window in which to collect packet statistics. 
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